Moral Hazard Problems Under Public Health Insurance Evidence from Vietnam
This paper investigates moral hazard problems. By using the matching estimator technique to estimate the effect of health care insurance on the demand for health care treatment, we find that the new health care policy enacted in 2005 is more likely to generate the effect of moral hazard on outp...
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| Tác giả chính: | |
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| Định dạng: | Bài trích |
| Ngôn ngữ: | English |
| Thông tin xuất bản: |
VNU
2014
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| Chủ đề: | |
| Truy cập trực tuyến: | http://repository.vnu.edu.vn/handle/11126/4749 |
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| Tóm tắt: | This paper investigates moral hazard problems. By using the matching estimator
technique to estimate the effect of health care insurance on the demand for health care treatment,
we find that the new health care policy enacted in 2005 is more likely to generate the effect of
moral hazard on outpatient visits at state health care providers, but not on inpatient visits. In other
words, we find strong evidence for the existence ofmoral hazard effect on outpatient visits at the
state hospital system. Therefore, it is too risk bearing to manage health insurance funds at local or
state levels if there are no appropriate policies to share the risk and prevent an overconsumption
scenario because insured patients can take advantage of more medical services, which lead to a
significant shortage of health insurance funds. Thegovernment should implement effective and
efficient process management as well as impose an optimal deductible and copayment mechanism
to solve critical issues of moral hazard. Additionally, to slower growth of health costs, the
government should create public health services forhome medical treatment to consult patients
with minor ailments. This analysis is based on two large nationwide samples of Vietnamese
Household Living Standard Surveys conducted in 2004and 2006. |
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